

Ramon Harvey

Abū Bakr Aḥmad al-Jaṣṣāṣ

1 Introduction

Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. ‘Alī r-Rāzī l-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 981/370) was a major Ḥanafī jurist, legal theorist and exegete of the tenth century. Although originally from Rayy to the west of Khurasan, he mainly studied and taught in Baghdad, becoming an important figure in the early lineage of the classical Ḥanafī school. He is especially notable for his written legacy, which along with commentaries on earlier juristic manuals, includes the earliest surviving extended text of Ḥanafī *uṣūl al-fiqh* (legal theory) and one of the first sustained exegetical treatments of the Qur’ān’s legal content in the genre of *aḥkām al-Qur’ān* (legislation of the Qur’ān). It is at this confluence of Ḥanafī legal theorization and exegetical application that the distinctive contribution of al-Jaṣṣāṣ to the history of Qur’ānic hermeneutics should be sought. An important aspect of the investigation in this article concerns the debate over al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s theological affiliation and to what extent his thought should be associated with the Mu’tazila, a theological school often linked with early Ḥanafism.

2 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s Life, Works and Intellectual Milieu

Al-Jaṣṣāṣ was born in 917/305 in Rayy, before relocating in 937/325 to Baghdad, which was a major hub for scholars of varying religions, doctrinal affiliations and intellectual disciplines. He attached himself to Abū l-Ḥasan al-Karkhī (d. 952/340), the most prominent Ḥanafī scholar in the city and arguably the first teacher of the classical legal school.¹ The initial decades of his life coincided with the final decline of the Abbasid state as a political force. It had been greatly weakened since the mid-ninth century and finally became a titular caliphate upon the Būyid conquest of Baghdad in 945/334.² Unsurprisingly given the unstable conditions, a great famine is noted to have occurred in Baghdad during the same year, apparently leading its desperate residents to eat cats, dogs and even partake in cannibalism.³ These events prompted al-Jaṣṣāṣ to

1 ‘Abd al-Qādir b. Abī l-Wafā’, *al-Jawāhir al-muḍīyya ft ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanafīyya*, ed. ‘Abd al-Faṭṭāḥ Muḥammad al-Ḥalw (Cairo: Dār al-Hajr, 1993), 1: 223; Christopher Melchert, *The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries C.E.* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 125.

2 Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 1: 493–95.

3 Abū l-Fidā’ b. Kathīr, *al-Bidāya wa-n-nihāya*, ed. ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Abd al-Muḥsin at-Turki (Cairo: Dār Hajr, 2003), 15: 170.

travel to al-Ahwāz, a town between Iraq and Khurasan, until the situation became more settled.⁴

After returning to Baghdad, he continued to apprentice himself under al-Karkhī until this teacher advised him to travel with the young hadith scholar al-Ḥākim an-Nīsābūrī (d. 1014/405) to Nishapur.⁵ This journey must have taken place in the late 330s because al-Karkhī died in 952/340 following al-Jaṣṣāṣ's departure. Whilst some commentators have claimed al-Ḥākim as a teacher of al-Jaṣṣāṣ, perhaps to support the latter's inclusion in the canon of "Sunnī orthodoxy," there seems to be little evidence for this relationship, especially considering that al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in his mid-thirties, would have been nearly twenty years al-Ḥākim's senior. It is more likely that they travelled as peers with al-Ḥākim charged with introducing al-Jaṣṣāṣ to the major scholars of his city. In Nishapur, he continued his studies in Ḥanafī *fiqh* (jurisprudence), as well as grammar, linguistics and hadith from well-known teachers.⁶

Al-Jaṣṣāṣ settled in Baghdad for good in 956/344 and started instructing students at an institution known as Darb al-Maqbara.⁷ In 972/360, he took up al-Karkhī's old teaching position at the mosque next to the tomb of Darb 'Abda,⁸ which was given to the senior Ḥanafī scholar in the city.⁹ It seems that except for his scholarly activities, al-Jaṣṣāṣ's life during this period was relatively uneventful. He is described as a person of abstinence (*zuhd*) and piety (*wara*), and as having refused on two occasions to take the position of *qāḍī*, all qualities shared by al-Karkhī.¹⁰

By devoting the final quarter century of his life to teaching and writing, al-Jaṣṣāṣ bequeathed a substantial scholarly legacy. His most significant students were Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Mūsā al-Khwārizmī (d. 1012/403) and Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Jurjānī (d. 1008/398),¹¹ both of whom were to later give their names to the Ḥanafī mosques in

4 Safvet Halilović, *al-Imām Abū Bakr ar-Rāzi l-Jaṣṣāṣ wa-manhajuhu fi t-tafsīr* (Cairo: Dār as-Salām, 2008), 55.

5 Ibn Abī l-Wafā', *al-Jawāhir al-muḍīyya*, 1: 223.

6 See Murteza Bedir, "Al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981)," in *Islamic Legal Thought: A Compendium of Muslim Jurists*, ed. Oussama Arabi, David S. Powers and Susan A. Spector (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 149–50.

7 'Abd al-Wahhāb ash-Shaykh Ḥamad, *Madrasat at-tafsīr fi Baghdād fi l-qarnayn al-hijriyīn ath-thālith wa-r-rābi'* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 2013), 192.

8 Also known as Darb 'Abduh. See Ibn Abī l-Wafā', *al-Jawāhir al-muḍīyya*, 2: 238, n. 2.

9 Ḥamad, *Madrasat at-tafsīr fi Baghdād*, 192; Melchert, *The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law*, 128.

10 Abū l-Fidā' Qāsim b. Quṭlūbughā, *Tāj at-tarājim*, ed. Muḥammad Khayr Ramaḍān Yūsuf (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1992), 96; Ibn Abī l-Wafā', *al-Jawāhir al-muḍīyya*, 1: 222; Melchert, *The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law*, 129.

11 On the contribution of al-Jurjānī to the transmission of al-Jaṣṣāṣ's theoretical work, see David R. Vishanoff, *The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists Imagined a Revealed Law* (New Haven, CT: American Oriental Society, 2011), 220, n. 185.

which they taught on the west side of Baghdad.¹² In turn, al-Jurjānī's student Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Qudūrī (d. 1037/428) was to author the most celebrated *mukhtaṣar* (legal manual) of the classical Ḥanafī tradition.¹³

The written output of al-Jaṣṣāṣ was considerable, though not all his texts have survived to the present day. Most titles mentioned in the sources are legal commentaries on the works of major Ḥanafī authors that preceded him. These principally include the following:¹⁴ the *Jāmi' al-kabīr*, *Jāmi' aṣ-ṣaghīr*, and *al-Manāsik*¹⁵ of Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan ash-Shaybānī (d. 805/189), *Adab al-qāḍī* of Abū Bakr al-Khaṣṣāf (d. 874/261), and the *mukhtaṣars* of al-Karkhī and Abū Ja'far aṭ-Ṭahāwī (d. 933/321). He also wrote a commentary on a theological text, *al-Asmā' al-ḥusnā*, and an abridgement of aṭ-Ṭahāwī's *Ikhtilāf al-ulamā'/al-fuqahā'*.¹⁶ Finally, he composed original treatises, such as *Ja-wābāt al-masā'il* on applied jurisprudence, and *al-Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl* and *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān* on legal theory and legally focused Qur'ānic exegesis respectively. The latter two books, written near the end of al-Jaṣṣāṣ's life and available in published editions, will be discussed in more detail when considering his Qur'ānic hermeneutics in the next section.

The intellectual environment of tenth-century Baghdad was diverse. For the present study, it is salient to highlight two main groups. The *ahl al-ḥadīth* was a pietistic movement of Sunnī traditionalism centered on the collection of hadiths from the early Muslim community. The Mu'tazila was an internally diverse school of rational theology, frequently with its own pietistic tendencies, that was a rival intellectual current in the city. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ's teacher al-Karkhī would study theology under the prominent Mu'tazilī scholar Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Baṣrī (d. 980/369) who, in turn, would study jurisprudence under him.¹⁷ Yet, as the story involving al-Ḥākim and the facts of al-

12 See George Makdisi, "Muslim Institutions of Learning in Eleventh-Century Baghdad," *BSOAS* 24, no. 1 (1961), 18f. Makdisi points out that for the institution named after al-Khwārizmī, this location is only probable.

13 For details of the life and intellectual context of al-Qudūrī, see Talal Al-Azem, *Rule-Formulation and Binding Precedent in the Madhhab-Law Tradition* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 23–36. For comments on the significance of the *mukhtaṣar*, see Norman Calder, *Islamic Jurisprudence in the Classical Era*, edited by Colin Imber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 23f.

14 See Ibn Abī l-Wafā', *al-Jawāhir al-muḍīyya*, 1: 223; Ibn Qutlūbughā, *Tāj at-tarājim*, 96; Muḥammad 'Abd al-Ḥayy al-Laknawī, *Kitāb al-fawā'id al-bahīyya fī tarājim al-Ḥanafīyya*, ed. Muḥammad Badr ad-Dīn abū Firās an-Na'sānī (Cairo: Maṭba'at as-Sa'āda, 1906), 28; Saeedullah, "Life and Works of Abū Bakr al-Rāzī al-Jaṣṣāṣ," *Islamic Studies* 16, no. 2 (1977), 134f.; Halilović, *al-Imām Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī l-Jaṣṣāṣ*, 120.

15 The clarification that this is a commentary on ash-Shaybānī's book is made by Halilović, *al-Imām Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī l-Jaṣṣāṣ*, 123.

16 There has been some debate over whether this text, which has been published, is aṭ-Ṭahāwī's original or al-Jaṣṣāṣ's summary. Most modern commentators argue for the latter. See Saeedullah, "Life and Works of Abū Bakr al-Rāzī al-Jaṣṣāṣ," 135–38; Halilović, *al-Imām Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī l-Jaṣṣāṣ*, 127f.

17 Hans-Thomas Tillschneider, *Die Entstehung der juristischen Hermeneutik (uṣūl al-fiqh) im frühen Islam* (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2006), 132.

Jaṣṣāṣ's own training indicate, this did not preclude Baghdadi Ḥanafī appreciation for the intricacies of the hadith tradition. The interest in and ongoing discussion over al-Jaṣṣāṣ's intellectual commitments partly stems from the attempt to locate his thought in relation to these disparate movements.

3 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ's Theological Commitments, Hermeneutic Contributions and Major Works

The works of al-Jaṣṣāṣ that principally concern us when considering his Qur'ānic hermeneutics are his *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān* and his *al-Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl*. The former, which he mentions in none of his other books, is likely one of the last works that he wrote. As is well known, Muslim scholars often composed their exegesis of the Qur'ān at the end of their lives, gathering their knowledge in various Islamic disciplines.¹⁸

At the beginning of the extant text of *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*, al-Jaṣṣāṣ refers to its now-lost introduction (*muqaddima*) in the following words:

We placed at the start of this book an introduction that gathers together all whereof one cannot be ignorant about the foundations of theology (*uṣūl at-tawḥīd*). [It is] a preparation for what is needed to know the ways to infer the meanings of the Qur'ān, to extract its evidence, to master its articulations and what can be derived from it in terms of the different aspects of the speech of the Arabs, names within language, and legal expressions. This is because it is the foremost discipline for knowing the oneness of God and exalting him above similarity to His creation and above what the lazy ascribe to Him of injustice to His servants. Now, it has brought us to declare the rulings of the Qur'ān and its evidence (. . .)¹⁹

This passage appears to act as a bridge between the introduction mentioned and the remainder of the book, which begins with exegesis of the *Basmala*. The missing portion, though it is characterized with qualities familiar from the discourse of legal theory, is highlighted as essential to negate God's similarity to the creation and any claim that He is unjust to it. The introduction would thus seem to have furnished a hermeneutic for interpreting both the theological and legal content in the Qur'ān – in other words, principles of exegesis (*uṣūl at-tafsīr*).

Though this could overlap in content with the first part of the extant *al-Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl*, which prominently deals with the implications of language for the Qur'ān, there is no reference to the other theoretical topics in that text, such as the sunna, consensus (*ijmā'*) and analogy (*qiyās*). It therefore seems unlikely that the *muqaddima* in question should be identified with *al-Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl*, as some commentators have

¹⁸ Halilović, *al-Imām Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī l-Jaṣṣāṣ*, 153f.

¹⁹ Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī l-Jaṣṣāṣ, *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*, ed. Muḥammad aṣ-Ṣādiq Qamḥāwī (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā' at-Turāth al-'Arabī, 1992), 1: 5. For another translation, see Bedir, "Al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981)," 155.

thought.²⁰ Moreover, when al-Jaṣṣāṣ regularly refers readers of *Aḥkām al-Qurʾān* to his *al-Uṣūl* for further details on points of legal theory, he does not seem to mean thereby the introduction to the same book, but a separate one.²¹ The most plausible explanation is that after writing his manual on *uṣūl al-fiqh*, he summarized relevant discussions as well as core theological principles when composing the introduction to his legal *tafsīr* (exegesis).

Al-Jaṣṣāṣ's theological stance has long been the subject of discussion with commentators arguing for, or merely assuming, his Mu'tazilism.²² Like *Aḥkām al-Qurʾān*, the extant manuscripts of *al-Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl* lack an introduction (as well as some of the initial section on legal theory),²³ which provokes the question of whether both were excised due to the presence of overt Mu'tazilī views. Though it is not uncommon for the first pages of manuscripts to be lost, it is suggestive that the parts of al-Jaṣṣāṣ's works that would have systematically outlined his theological commitments are missing while voluminous juristic writings have been reliably transmitted from him. Kevin Reinhart has made one of the more careful treatments of the question, criticising the credibility of this association in the biographical sources. His most significant contribution is to point out that whereas al-Jaṣṣāṣ adopts positions in his *al-Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl* on the objectivity of moral value before divine revelation and on the role of the human mind (*'aql*) that are shared with the Mu'tazila, this reflects the intellectual fluidity of his era rather than his doctrinal allegiance.²⁴

The questions that Reinhart focuses upon are from the discipline of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, not from *ilm al-kalām* (rational theology), which usually acts as the determinant of theological identity. A clearer picture emerges when looking at the theological content within his other writings, especially *Aḥkām al-Qurʾān*. As the passage quoted above from the beginning of the extant text shows, al-Jaṣṣāṣ lines up his theological objectives very closely with the Mu'tazilī emphasis on God's oneness (*tawḥīd*) and justice (*'adl*). Though these divine qualities were affirmed in a general sense by all theologi-

20 See Halilović, *al-Imām Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī l-Jaṣṣāṣ*, 446; al-Jaṣṣāṣ, *Aḥkām al-Qurʾān*, 1: 5, n. 1; Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī l-Jaṣṣāṣ, *al-Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl*, ed. 'Ujayl Jāsim an-Nashamī (Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-sh-Shu'ūn al-Islāmiyya, 1994), 1: 30.

21 For example, see al-Jaṣṣāṣ, *Aḥkām al-Qurʾān*, 1: 107; 2: 77; 4: 169.

22 See Muḥammad b. Aḥmad adh-Dhahabī, *Siyar a'lām an-nubalā'*, ed. Shu'ayb al-Arna'ūt, 29 vols. (Beirut: Mu'assasat ar-Risāla, 1996), 16: 341; Wilferd Madelung, "The Spread of Māturidism and the Turks," in *Actas IV Congresso de Estudos Árabes e Islâmicos Coimbra-Lisboa 1968* (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 112; Nabil Shehaby, "Illa and Qiyās in Early Islamic Legal Theory," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 102, no. 1 (1982), 27; Marie Bernand, "Ḥanafī Uṣūl al-Fiqh through a Manuscript of al-Jaṣṣāṣ," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 105, no. 4 (1985), 624–25.

23 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, *al-Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl*, 1: 30f.

24 A. Kevin Reinhart, *Before Revelation: The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 46–50. Another treatment that refrains from outright ascribing al-Jaṣṣāṣ to the Mu'tazila is Bedir, "Al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981)," 156–60.

cal schools, the Mu'tazila were distinguished by their maximal interpretation of God's transcendence and the rational intelligibility of divine justice towards human beings.

Al-Jaṣṣāṣ continues this twin emphasis during his exegesis, for instance when interpreting Q 35:29: "It is those of His servants who have knowledge who stand in true awe of God,"²⁵ He explains that the person who knows God's oneness and justice with proofs is thereby brought to stand in awe of Him.²⁶ Again, when commenting on Q 24:41: "Do you not see that all those who are in the heavens and earth praise God?," he comments that this praise (*tasbīḥ*), when applied to rational beings, is belief in God's transcendence (*tanzīḥ*) over what is impermissible to ascribe to Him of attributes.²⁷ Though the possibility of interpreting *tasbīḥ* in terms of *tanzīḥ* is mentioned by non-Mu'tazilī exegetes of al-Jaṣṣāṣ's era,²⁸ his emphasis on negating "impermissible attributes" is striking.

Strong evidence of a Mu'tazilī stance towards the divine attributes can be found in a discussion from his *Sharḥ mukhtaṣar aṭ-Ṭaḥāwī*. When writing about oaths, he repudiates swearing by substantive attributes, such as "God's power (*qudrat Allāh*)," in favor of expressions amenable to the Mu'tazila, like "God is powerful (*Allāh qādir*)."²⁹ With respect to divine justice, al-Jaṣṣāṣ interprets Q 6:107, "Had God willed, they would not have associated partners with Him," to deny that God could have willed to force human beings to believe in Him alone, as this would have "prevented obedience and nullified reward and punishment in the Hereafter."³⁰ This also seems to reflect a typical Mu'tazilī stance on the relationship between divine and human action.³¹

These indications of al-Jaṣṣāṣ's theological proclivities can be brought into sharper hermeneutic relief by studying his treatment of a specific theological question, the Beatific Vision (*ar-ru'ya*). He rejects this doctrine, in common with the Mu'tazila, and against the *ahl as-sunna wa-l-jamā'a*, when commenting on Q 6:103: "No vision perceives Him, but He perceives all vision (*lā tudrikuhu al-abṣār wa-huwa yudriku al-abṣār*):"

It is said: the origin of perceiving (*al-idrāk*) is reaching (*al-luḥūq*), like your saying, "He reached the time of al-Manṣūr," "He reached Abū Ḥanīfa," "The food was done" – that is, it reached the

25 Translations of Qur'ānic passages follow that of Abdel Haleem, *The Qur'an: English Translation and Parallel Arabic Text* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), with modifications as needed.

26 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*, 5: 246f.

27 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*, 5: 189.

28 See, for example, Abū Manṣūr al-Māturidī, *Ta'wīlāt al-Qur'ān*, ed. Ertuğrul Boyunukalin and Bekir Topaloğlu (Istanbul: Dār al-Mizān, 2006), 10: 180.

29 Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī l-Jaṣṣāṣ, *Sharḥ mukhtaṣar aṭ-Ṭaḥāwī*, ed. Sā'id Bakdāsh (Beirut: Dār al-Bashā'ir al-Islāmiyya, 2010), 7: 387f. See Bakdāsh's comments in 1: 109f.; William Montgomery Watt, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought* (London: Oneworld, 2008), 246.

30 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*, 4: 170.

31 See Watt, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought*, 233f.

state of being well-cooked, “The crop and the fruit ripened,” and, “The boy matured” – when he reached the state of manhood.³² The vision’s perception of a thing is it reaching it in sight,³³ because there is no disagreement among linguists (*ahl al-lughā*) that the statement of the one saying, “I perceived someone with my vision” means, “I saw them with my vision.” It is not possible that perceiving is encompassing (*al-iḥāṭa*), as the house encompasses what is inside it, but does not “reach” it.

So, His statement, Most High, “No vision perceives Him” means that no vision sees Him. This is laudatory in the negation of the *ruʿya* of vision, like His statement, Most High, “Neither slumber nor sleep overtakes Him” [Q 2:255], and whatever for God is laudatory in negation from Himself, then affirming the opposite is disparagement and diminution. So, affirming His contrary state is not permissible, just as the worthiness of the attribute of “Neither slumber nor sleep overtakes Him” would not be nullified, except by affirming an attribute of diminution.

It cannot be treated as specified (*makhṣūṣ*) by His statement, Most High, “On that Day there will be radiant faces gazing at [here interpreted as: in anticipation (of reward) from] their Lord” [Q 75:22–23]. This is because *an-naẓar* (lit. gazing) is open to various meanings, such as “anticipating reward” (*intiẓār ath-thawāb*), as has been narrated from a group from the forerunners (*salaf*). So, as it is open to interpretation (*at-taʿwīl*), the objection that there is no good reason for interpretation is impermissible. The only intent of the [hadith] reports narrated about the *ruʿya*, were they sound, is knowledge. It is necessary knowledge that uncertainty cannot tarnish and doubts cannot oppose, because *ruʿya* with the meaning of knowledge is well-known in the language.³⁴

Al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s argument, which proceeds in three steps (indicated by the paragraphs in the translation above), demonstrates the theological hermeneutics of which he was capable. First, he provides several examples of speech to show that the perceiving (*al-idrāk*) mentioned in Q 6:103 comes linguistically from the idea of “reaching” (*luḥūq*) and must be identified with vision that reaches out to its objects, according to the emission theories that were prevalent in his day. Second, by comparison with Q 2:255, he proposes that the negation of visibility from God is praiseworthy and that to affirm the *ruʿya* as the Beatific Vision would be to attribute a defect to the divine nature. Third, he uses *uṣūlī* terminology to argue against an opponent who would use Q 75:22–23 for *takhṣīṣ* (specification) to mean that Q 6:103 would only apply to the worldly life. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ points out that as Q 75:22–23 is open to interpretation, and does not necessarily refer to seeing, it cannot specify Q 6:103. Likewise, he raises a doubt over the authenticity of narrated reports mentioning the Beatific Vision and argues that the meaning of *ruʿya* therein is knowledge, rather than sight.

32 These phrases all use the verb *adraka* idiomatically.

33 This way of writing about optics likely reflects the reception into Arabic of Greek theories that explained vision in part or whole through the emission of rays from the eyes towards the objects of sight. See David C. Lindberg, “Alhazen’s Theory of Vision and Its Reception in the West,” *Isis* 58, no. 3 (1967), 321.

34 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, *Aḥkām al-Qurʾān*, 4: 169f. See also 4: 209.

Although most early Mu'tazilī *tafsīr* works are not extant,³⁵ al-Jaṣṣāṣ's treatment of Q 6:103 fits firmly within what is known of the Mu'tazilī tradition of exegetical responses to the verse. The Samarqandī Ḥanafī Abū Maṣṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 944/333), who theologically opposed the Baghdadī Mu'tazilism of Abū l-Qāsim al-Ka'bī (d. 931/319), discusses the verse with similar terminology, but argues for the reality of the Beatific Vision, albeit without "reaching" or "encompassing."³⁶ Over a century later, the Zaydī Mu'tazilī exegete al-Ḥākim al-Jishumī (d. 1101/494) treats the verse in virtually identical terms to al-Jaṣṣāṣ.³⁷

On the question of God's *wa'īd* (threat), which pertains in the present context to the possibility of divine forgiveness for unrepentant major sinners, al-Jaṣṣāṣ is harder to read. Murteza Bedir points out that, in his *al-Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl*, he does not contradict the position of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 767/150) that such people can be forgiven or not as God wishes, which would oppose one of the five core Mu'tazilī principles (*al-uṣūl al-khamsa*).³⁸ Yet when read carefully, he does not endorse it either. The main question under debate is whether Abū Ḥanīfa held the position of suspending judgement (*waqf*) on the generality of reports (*'umūm al-akhbār*). Some scholars had claimed that Abū Ḥanīfa's position on the *wa'īd* was based on the generality (*'umūm*) of the Qur'ānic verses mentioning the punishment of major sinners. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ's response is that if this was indeed Abū Ḥanīfa's school of thought (*madhhab*) on the theological question, it was not due to *waqf* on general (*'āmm*) texts, but because he considered key verses denying such forgiveness to refer in their specificity (*khuṣūṣ*) to unbelievers, not to major sinners.³⁹ He then quotes 'Īsā b. Abān (d. 836/221) who argues that as there are verses both supporting the punishment and pardon of the major sinner, the correct position is to defer the matter for God's decision (*irjā'*).⁴⁰ Al-Jaṣṣāṣ concludes

35 Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya has published six commentaries by Mu'tazilī authors in a five-volume series titled *Mawsū'at tafāsīr al-Mu'tazila*. These have been reconstructed by Khiḍr Muḥammad Nabḥā from quotes preserved in other works and can be of limited historical use in understanding the full exegetical concerns of the authors. For example, under Q 6:103, the reconstructed texts for Abū l-Qāsim al-Ka'bī (d. 931/319), Abū l-Ḥasan ar-Rummānī (d. 994/384) and Abū 'Alī l-Jubbā'ī (d. 915/303) all print the same quotation from *at-Tibyān* of the Shiite exegete Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī (d. 1273/672). This reports 'Ā'isha's rejection of any claim to seeing God and her recitation of Q 6:103 as proof, stating it is the position of the *ahl al-'adl* (the Mu'tazila) among the exegetes, listing the three scholars in question. See Abū l-Qāsim al-Ka'bī, *Tafsīr*, ed. Khiḍr Muḥammad Nabḥā (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 2006), 210f.; Abū l-Ḥasan ar-Rummānī, *Tafsīr*, ed. Khiḍr Muḥammad Nabḥā (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 2009), 90; Abū 'Alī l-Jubbā'ī, *Tafsīr*, ed. Khiḍr Muḥammad Nabḥā (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 2007), 222.

36 Al-Māturīdī, *Ta'wīlāt al-Qur'ān*, 5: 165.

37 Al-Ḥākim al-Jishumī, *at-Tahdīb fī t-tafsīr*, ed. 'Abd ar-Raḥmān b. Sulaymān as-Sālimī (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-Maṣrī, 2018–19), 3: 2349.

38 Bedir, "Al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981)," 159, n. 55. Also see Watt, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought*, 229.

39 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, *al-Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl*, 1: 102f.

40 *Ibid.*, 1: 103.

that the text quoted from Ibn Abān shows that there is no *waqf* upon the general (*‘āmm*) report and no dissension about the matter amongst the Ḥanafis.⁴¹

Al-Jaṣṣāṣ also mentions a difference of opinion over the *wa’id* in a passage in his *Aḥkām al-Qur’ān*, which shows how his theological precepts intersect with his legal hermeneutics. He observes that some of the ignorant *ḥashwiyya*⁴² and *aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth* thought that Q 4:10: “those who consume the wealth of the orphans wrongfully . . .” had been abrogated by Q 2:220: “If you share with them [orphans], then they are your brothers.”⁴³ He comments as follows:

This statement indicates the ignorance of its author about the meaning of abrogation and about what is permissible to abrogate from what is not. There is no dispute among Muslims that consuming the wealth of orphans wrongfully is forbidden and that the threat (*al-wa’id*) mentioned in the verse is established for it. The difference of opinion among them is over whether inflicting the threat (*ilḥāq al-wa’id*) on its account in the Hereafter is without doubt or with the permissibility of forgiveness.⁴⁴

Whereas al-Jaṣṣāṣ is clear in this passage that God cannot abrogate His prohibition of such a wrong, he considers the question of forgiveness for the unrepentant major sinner in the Hereafter – a key point of contention between the Mu’tazila and others – subject to a legitimate difference of opinion. His framing of the discussion implies that he favors the Mu’tazilī view that it will not be granted.

The same impression is given by al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s treatment of provisions in Q 5:95 prohibiting hunting when in the state of consecration for pilgrimage. The verse stipulates that someone who intentionally hunts must pay a penalty and various options are given. Then it states, “God forgives what is past, but if anyone goes back to it, God will punish him.” Al-Jaṣṣāṣ supports an interpretation of this verse whereby a worldly penalty is mandated along with a divine punishment for each transgression, rather than just for a repeated offence. He understands the stated forgiveness as only referring to actions before the prohibition and does not suggest that the *wa’id* will be lifted in the Hereafter.⁴⁵

41 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s final remark: “And none of our companions relate the opposite, indicating that it is the position of all of them,” more plausibly refers to the subject of the previous sentence and topic at hand, the epistemic status of *‘umūm al-akḥbār*, than to the *wa’id*. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, *al-Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl*, 1: 103.

42 A derogatory term sometimes used for either Ḥanbalīs or the uneducated masses, especially those who held an anthropomorphic conception of God.

43 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, *Aḥkām al-Qur’ān*, 2: 372.

44 Ibid., 2: 372.

45 Ibid., 4: 141. Compare with al-Māturīdī who primarily reads the punishment in the verse as for a person who considers hunting while consecrated for pilgrimage permissible and the forgiveness for one who repents from this. Al-Māturīdī, *Ta’wīlāt al-Qur’ān*, 4: 345. Thus, whereas al-Māturīdī links the *wa’id* to disbelief, al-Jaṣṣāṣ links it to sin. A final example of al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s approach to this question is his reference to those who flee from battle when outnumbered two-to-one (against the promise of victory made in Q 8:66) as *aḥl al-wa’id*. See al-Jaṣṣāṣ, *Aḥkām al-Qur’ān*, 4: 227.

From these inquiries, it is apparent that al-Jaṣṣāṣ's intellectual commitments go beyond a general rational approach held in common with Mu'tazilī thinkers. He openly adopts core Mu'tazilī theological positions and defends them with their own arguments. Yet this theology has been naturalized within the Ḥanafī juristic tradition, which as seen from his treatment of the *wa'īd*, combines alternative theological conceptions with the same body of legal rules.⁴⁶ Such Mu'tazilī Ḥanafism, as found in the previous generation by al-Karkhī, continued as a tradition for many centuries, though it was increasingly overshadowed by rival traditionalist and "Māturīdī" strands.⁴⁷

If these are the theological elements of al-Jaṣṣāṣ's approach to Qur'ānic interpretation, what about his legal hermeneutics? As his commentarial activities in jurisprudence show, by his time the corpus of Ḥanafī rulings was in place, so he mainly expended his effort in their explanation, defence and articulation through legal theory. Several authors have observed that central to the genre of *uṣūl al-fiqh* is the provision of a theoretical framework to show how the rules of a given school can be consistently derived from the legal sources.⁴⁸ The Qur'ān is the pre-eminent text requiring hermeneutic engagement in this way. Within full manuals of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, of which al-Jaṣṣāṣ's *al-Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl* is the earliest extant Ḥanafī paradigm, the first section on Qur'ānic interpretation outlines the main linguistic and conceptual categories for the endeavor.

David Vishanoff has argued that, by the middle of the eleventh century, Sunni legal schools had adopted a shared flexible legal hermeneutic. That is, their theoretical systems were set up in broadly similar ways to allow for the maximum power to derive legal meaning from scripture and the flexibility to correlate it with their own school's corpus of rulings.⁴⁹ Although individual schools and jurists varied, much was shared in common, especially when compared to the theologically minded systems promoted by alternative tendencies, such as the Zāhirīs, the Basran Mu'tazilīs, and the prominent Ash'arī theologian Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 1013/403).⁵⁰

46 The possibility to accommodate different theologies within a shared approach to law was an important aspect of the *madhhab* system. See Melchert, *The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law*, 129. When al-Jaṣṣāṣ wants to single out his own group in *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*, he uses the phrase *ahl al-ḥaqq* (the people of truth), a general expression in wider use within his era. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*, 2: 298, 323; 3: 126. See Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd* (Istanbul: Maktabat al-Irshād, 2010²), 270, 438.

47 Madelung, "The Spread of Māturīdism and the Turks," 116. Also see Ayedh S. Aldosari, *Ḥanafī Māturīdism: Trajectories of a Theological Legacy, with a Study and Critical Edition of al-Khabbāzī's Kitāb al-Hādī* (Sheffield: Equinox, 2020), 145f.

48 See Sherman A. Jackson, "Fiction and Formalism: Toward a Functional Analysis of *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*," in *Studies in Islamic Legal Theory*, ed. Bernard G. Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 195–200; Vishanoff, *The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics*, 254–61.

49 Vishanoff, *The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics*, 190.

50 *Ibid.*, 195.

Al-Jaṣṣāṣ can be situated at a point in this trajectory within the early legal theoretic tradition of the Baghdādī Ḥanafīs as the successor to al-Karkhī. The summary of legal principles preserved in al-Karkhī's text *al-Uṣūl*,⁵¹ and more importantly al-Jaṣṣāṣ's detailed record of his teacher's opinions, show that al-Karkhī is "the first Ḥanafī jurist for whom we have detailed evidence of a comprehensive legal hermeneutic."⁵² Importantly, given the preceding discussion of theological positioning, and in line with Vishanoff's argument about legal-minded theorists, it does not seem that al-Karkhī's legal theory draws on many Mu'tazilī ideas.⁵³ Al-Jaṣṣāṣ practiced the same separation of *uṣūl al-fiqh* from *kalām* and mainly contributed to the discipline through his comprehensive compilation and systemization of the positions of his school vis-à-vis its competitors.⁵⁴ But he does diverge from al-Karkhī on occasion, such as increasing the number of places in which general texts can be particularized.⁵⁵

A more significant hermeneutic achievement is al-Jaṣṣāṣ's exegetical elaboration of Ḥanafī legal theory within a full commentary upon the Qur'ān. He cannot be credited as the first author in the genre of *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*. He was preceded by the Ḥanafī 'Alī b. Mūsā l-Qummī (d. 917/305), who wrote a book on the subject from which he cites.⁵⁶ A related work was written by aṭ-Ṭahāwī, which is partially extant, though it is organized thematically and relies heavily on hadith – aṭ-Ṭahāwī's speciality – rather than taking the form of a legal *tafsīr*.⁵⁷

In *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*, which is a medium-sized *tafsīr* filling five printed volumes, al-Jaṣṣāṣ works through the entire Qur'ān, devoting space in proportion to its legal content. This means that his commentary on sura 2, *al-Baqara* (The Cow), the longest and most legally comprehensive sura, takes up nearly two-fifths of the text. Moreover, he divides his comments on suras into different sections (*abwāb*), each in which he covers a certain legal topic connected to the verse at hand, drawing in material from

51 This has been printed with a commentary by Abū Ḥafs an-Nasafī (d. 1142/537) as an appendix to the *Ta'sīs an-naẓar* of Abū Zayd ad-Dabūsī (d. 1039/430). The material from al-Karkhī is mainly in the form of short maxims, beginning "The principle (*al-aṣl*) . . ." See Abū Zayd ad-Dabūsī, *Ta'sīs an-naẓar wa-yalīhi risālat al-imām Abī l-Ḥasan al-Karkhī fi uṣūl*, ed. Muṣṭafā Muḥammad al-Qabbānī (Beirut: Dār Ibn Zaydūn, n. d.), 161–75.

52 Vishanoff, *The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics*, 215, n. 152.

53 *Ibid.*, 216.

54 Murteza Bedir, "The Early Development of Ḥanafī *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*" (PhD diss., University of Manchester, 1999), 13f.

55 Vishanoff, *The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics*, 219f. Vishanoff argues that Tillschneider mischaracterizes al-Jaṣṣāṣ's position by presenting him as a strong defender of generality, similar to certain Mu'tazilī theorists. This, he contends, ignores his attenuations of the principle and its mainly symbolic nature. See Vishanoff, *The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics*, 220, n. 184. Compare with Tillschneider, *Die Entstehung der juristischen Hermeneutik*, 137–39.

56 Halilović, *al-Imām Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī l-Jaṣṣāṣ*, 192.

57 See Abū Ja'far aṭ-Ṭahāwī, *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*, ed. Sa'd ad-Dīn Ūnāl (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1998).

elsewhere in the Qurʾān, hadiths, early juristic opinions and *uṣūlī* analysis. For suras containing less legal material, he does not make use of sections, but chooses certain verses for theological elaboration and select explanatory remarks. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ's exegetical focus on the scripture as the site for the vindication of a corpus of legal rules prompts John Wansbrough's citation of his book as a prime example of what he calls halakhic exegesis, due to the analogy with the Midrash Halakha of Judaism.⁵⁸ Luke Yarbrough has also referred to al-Jaṣṣāṣ's social commentary in the book to illustrate what he calls "prescriptive discourses," literary productions that do not remain at the level of abstract scholasticism but use "overtly normative language to urge change in human affairs."⁵⁹

I have identified al-Jaṣṣāṣ's major contribution to Qurʾānic hermeneutics in his utilization of *uṣūl* categories to extract legal positions from scripture that line up with his existing juristic commitments. I will now work through a couple of examples to demonstrate his method. The first concerns the distinction between *āmm* (general) and *khāṣṣ* (specific) texts, which is one of the most important discussions within *uṣūl al-fiqh* and, as we have seen, one of the main dividing lines (partly real and partly symbolic) with other schools. Commenting on Q 9:103: "Take from their wealth alms to cleanse and purify them by it (*khudh min amwālihim ṣadaqatan tuṭahhīruhum bihā*)," al-Jaṣṣāṣ uses these concepts to locate the obligatory *zakāt* within the verse and to show that there is an obligation to give from all the relevant kinds of wealth.⁶⁰

Al-Jaṣṣāṣ discusses a difference of opinion over the verse's intent. Does it refer to the obligatory *zakāt* that is taken from Muslims in general or to an expiatory payment taken from specific people alluded to in the verse? He argues that the former is correct, despite the existence of the latter opinion on the authority of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 728/110). In the absence of an established report to specify (*khaṣṣ*), or to make an exception for, the people mentioned, they are the same as everybody else with respect to the obligations on their wealth. As there are no such obligations on people in general other than *zakāt*, the verse must be referring to it. Furthermore, cleansing and purifying do not point towards a specific expiation, as these meanings are also found in the term *zakāt* and other people in general are equally in need of them. Thus, despite the possibility for the verse to provide a particularized response to certain his-

58 John Wansbrough, *Quranic Studies: Sources and Methods of Scriptural Interpretation* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2004), 151, 185, 188. Midrash Halakha refers to works in the first two centuries CE that interpret the verses of the Torah through the rabbinic laws associated with them. See Hannah E. Hashkes, *Rabbinic Discourse as a System of Knowledge: "The Study of Torah is Equal to Them All"* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 20, n. 51.

59 Luke B. Yarbrough, *Friends of the Emir: Non-Muslim State Officials in Premodern Islamic Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 4. Also see 3–6.

60 The following discussion is drawn from al-Jaṣṣāṣ, *Aḥkām al-Qurʾān*, 4: 356.

torical events, the general-specific distinction allows al-Jaṣṣāṣ to read the verse as a general command for a core Islamic obligation.⁶¹

The next question that al-Jaṣṣāṣ addresses under Q 9:103 concerns whether collecting *zakāt* from one kind of wealth is sufficient. He points out that “take from their wealth” is a generality (*ʿumūm*) with respect to taking a portion from other relevant kinds of wealth.⁶² This, he avers, is the position of Abū l-Ḥasan al-Karkhī and he contrasts it with the view of those who hold that so long as it is taken from one kind of wealth the obligation in the verse is discharged. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ goes on to explain that whereas “alms” (*zakāt* or *ṣadaqa* in the Qurʾān) is ambiguous (*mujmal*) and requires explanation as to what is taken, the time it is taken and so on, the term “wealth” stands in general for all its meanings. Yet, the intent is specific for taking a certain part of it, rather than all of it, and for the obligation falling due at a certain time.

A second example of al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s legal exegesis relates to the status of the command (*amr*). He comments about Q 2:198: “When you surge down from Arafat remember God at the sacred place,” that in terms of its apparent (*ẓāhir*) meaning, there is no obligation to go to Mount Arafat for the ritual performance of the Hajj. But once the next verse is taken into account: “Surge down where the rest of the people do (Q 2:199),” its obligation becomes clear. This is because the linguistic imperative form “surge down” (*afīdū*) in Q 2:199 stipulates an obligation to be fulfilled. Yet, it cannot be obligatory to surge down from a location unless one was required to be there in the first place.⁶³ This is an implicit exegetical application of al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s stance, as elaborated in his *al-Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl*, that the imperative furnishes an obligation unless there is a textual indication that shifts it to an alternative status, such as a recommendation or permission.⁶⁴

Al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s hermeneutic legacy in the written genres of *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *aḥkām al-Qurʾān* is substantial. *Al-Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl* was superseded in the Ḥanafī tradition by *Kanz al-wuṣūl ilā maʾrifat al-uṣūl*, written by the Transoxianan ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Bazdawī (d. 1089/482). Although al-Bazdawī left some of the positions held by al-Karkhī and al-Jaṣṣāṣ, he followed the basic template provided by *al-Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl* as did the major Ḥanafī *uṣūl* manuals that followed. The influence of *Aḥkām al-Qurʾān* is equally pronounced. Again, it is the earliest extant text within its genre, thus providing the model for later authors. Yet the hybridity of works of *aḥkām al-Qurʾān*, which

61 See Wansbrough, *Quranic Studies*, 185. For a more technical discussion of the underlying hermeneutic debate, see Ramon Harvey, “The *sabab-khāṣṣ*—*ʿamm* Process as an Instructional Technique within Qurʾanic Rhetoric,” *JQS* 22, no. 1 (2020), 79–81.

62 In the context of *zakāt*, kinds of wealth (*aṣnāf al-amwāl*) refers to specific categories that are assessed for *zakāt* liability separately, such as gold, silver, sheep and cattle. See Abū l-Walīd b. Rushd, *Bidāyat al-mujtahid wa-nihāyat al-muqtaṣid*, ed. Farīd ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Jindī (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2004), 2: 11.

63 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, *Aḥkām al-Qurʾān*, 1: 387.

64 See al-Jaṣṣāṣ, *al-Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl*, 2: 87. See Bedir, “The Early Development of Ḥanafī *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*,” 76–78.

are neither fish nor fowl, neither *tafsīr* nor *fiqh*, and their rarity, means that al-Jaṣṣāṣ's book has kept its position as the dominant Ḥanafī expression of the form up until the present day. In fact, only the renowned text with the same name by the Mālikī Abū Bakr b. al-'Arabī (d. 1148/543) has had a comparable impact.

4 Conclusion

Some figures in the history of Islamic thought have advanced Qur'ānic interpretation by pioneering fundamentally new hermeneutic methods. Appropriately enough given al-Jaṣṣāṣ's preferred role as a commentator and systematizer, he was not one of them. Rather, *al-Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl* and *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*, two major books composed at the end of his life and conceived as a comprehensive hermeneutic theory and its scriptural application, should be seen as masterful works of intellectual consolidation. In *al-Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl*, al-Jaṣṣāṣ documented the Baghdadī school of Ḥanafism represented by himself and his teacher al-Karkhī and defended its positions against its rivals in exacting detail. Although it seems that most of the principles for interpreting the legal import of Qur'ānic language were already in place, al-Jaṣṣāṣ wrote the lasting presentation of them for posterity. *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān* was an even more notable achievement. Marshalling his materials, al-Jaṣṣāṣ produced a linear commentary of the entire Qur'ān that placed its legal content into sections familiar from the *fiqh* literature, and cross-referenced significant verses, hadiths and juristic opinions from the early community. He took these elements replete with frequent interpretive conflict and, with the conceptual terminology of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, weaved them into the definitive Ḥanafī reading of the Qur'ān's ethico-legal content.

Careful analysis of al-Jaṣṣāṣ's works reveal that he held undeniable Mu'tazilī inclinations on core theological questions, such as the nature of the divine attributes, the relationship between God's will and human action, and the Beatific Vision. As I have shown here, his legal project in *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān* did not preclude him from engaging in theological hermeneutics, in which he made use of Mu'tazilī arguments from his era. Yet it is doubtful that al-Jaṣṣāṣ self-identified as a Mu'tazilī in the manner of the famous theologians from that school. His primary affiliation was to Ḥanafī jurisprudence, which within his circle in fourth/tenth-century Baghdad, could be unproblematically combined with theological positions articulated and defended by the Mu'tazila. Despite the loss of the introductions to his final two major works – whether purposefully or not – enough material survives to show how he was able to advance the shared hermeneutic project of his legal school whilst retaining those commitments.

Bibliography

Sources

- Ad-Dabūsi, Abū Zayd. *Ta'sīs an-naẓar wa-yalīhi risālat al-imām Abī l-Ḥasan al-Karkhī fī uṣūl*. Ed. Muṣṭafā Muḥammad al-Qabbānī. Beirut: Dār Ibn Zaydūn, n. d.
- Adh-Dhahabī, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad. *Siyar a'lām an-nubalā'*. Ed. Shu'ayb al-Arna'ūt, 29 vols. Beirut: Mu'assasat ar-Risāla, 1996.
- Ibn Abī l-Wafā', 'Abd al-Qādir. *Al-Jawāhir al-muḍīyya fī ṭabaqāt al-Hanafīyya*. Ed. 'Abd al-Faṭṭāḥ Muḥammad al-Ḥalw, 5 vols. Cairo: Dār al-Hajr, 1993.
- Ibn Kathīr, Abū l-Fidā'. *Al-Bidāya wa-n-nihāya*. Ed. 'Abd Allāh b. 'Abd al-Muḥsin at-Turkī, 21 vols. Cairo: Dār Hajr, 2003.
- Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Abū l-Fidā' Qāsim. *Tāj at-tarājim*. Ed. Muḥammad Khayr Ramaḍān Yūsuf. Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1992.
- Ibn Rushd, Abū l-Walīd. *Bidāyat al-mujtahid wa-nihāyat al-muqtaṣid*. Ed. Farīd 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Jindī, 4 vols. Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2004.
- Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī. *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*. Ed. Muḥammad as-Ṣādiq Qamḥāwī, 5 vols. Beirut: Dār Iḥyā' at-Turāth al-'Arabī, 1992.
- Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī. *Al-Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl*. Ed. 'Ujayl Jāsim an-Nashamī, 4 vols. Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-sh-Shu'ūn al-Islāmiyya, 1994.
- Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī. *Sharḥ mukhtaṣar aṭ-Ṭaḥāwī*. Ed. Sā'id Bakdāsh, 8 vols. Beirut: Dār al-Bashā'ir al-Islāmiyya, 2010.
- Al-Jubbā'ī, Abū 'Alī. *Tafsīr*. Ed. Khayr Muḥammad Nabhā. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 2007.
- Al-Jishumī, al-Ḥakīm. *At-Taḥdīb fī t-tafsīr*. Ed. 'Abd ar-Raḥmān b. Sulaymān as-Sālimī, 10 vols. Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-Maṣrī, 2018–19.
- Al-Ka'bī, Abū l-Qāsim. *Tafsīr*. Ed. Khayr Muḥammad Nabhā. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 2006.
- Al-Laknawī, Muḥammad 'Abd al-Ḥayy. *Kitāb al-fawā'id al-bahīyya fī tarājim al-Hanafīyya*. Ed. Muḥammad Badr ad-Dīn abū Firās an-Na'sānī. Cairo: Maṭba'at as-Sa'āda, 1906.
- Al-Māturīdī, Abū Manṣūr. *Ta'wīlāt al-Qur'ān*. Ed. Bekir Topaloğlu, Ahmet Vanlioğlu, Mehmet Boynukalın, Ertuğrul Boynukalın et al., 18 vols. Istanbul: Dār al-Mizān, 2006.
- Al-Māturīdī, Abū Manṣūr. *Kitāb at-Tawḥīd*. Ed. Bekir Topaloğlu and Muḥammad Aruçi. Istanbul: Maktabat al-Irshād, 2010².
- Ar-Rummānī, Abū l-Ḥasan. *Tafsīr*. Ed. Khayr Muḥammad Nabhā. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 2009.
- Aṭ-Ṭaḥāwī, Abū Ja'far. *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*. Ed. Sa'd ad-Dīn Ünāl, 2 vols. Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1998.

Secondary Literature

- Abdel Haleem, M.A.S., *The Qur'an: English Translation and Parallel Arabic Text*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Aldosari, Ayyedh S. *Ḥanafī Māturīdīsm: Trajectories of a Theological Legacy, with a Study and Critical Edition of al-Khabbāzī's Kitāb al-Hādī*. Sheffield: Equinox, 2020.
- Al-Azem, Talal. *Rule-Formulation and Binding Precedent in the Madhhab-Law Tradition*. Leiden: Brill, 2016.
- Bedir, Murteza. "The Early Development of Ḥanafī Uṣūl al-Fiqh." PhD diss., University of Manchester, 1999.
- Bedir, Murteza. "Al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981)." In *Islamic Legal Thought: A Compendium of Muslim Jurists*, edited by Oussama Arabi, David S. Powers and Susan A. Spector. Leiden: Brill, 2013: 147–66.
- Bernand, Marie. "Ḥanafī Uṣūl al-Fiqh through a Manuscript of al-Jaṣṣāṣ." *JAOS* 105, no. 4 (1985): 623–35.

- Calder, Norman. *Islamic Jurisprudence in the Classical Era*, edited by Colin Imber. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- Halilović, Safvet. *Al-Imām Abū Bakr ar-Rāzī l-Jaṣṣāṣ wa-manhajuhu fī t-tafsīr*. Cairo: Dār as-Salām, 2008.
- Ḥamad, ‘Abd al-Wahhāb ash-Shaykh. *Madrasat at-tafsīr fī Baghdād fī l-qarnayn al-hijriyīn ath-thālith wa-r-rābi’*. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 2013.
- Harvey, Ramon. “The *sabab-khāṣṣ*—*‘āmm* Process as an Instructional Technique within Qur’anic Rhetoric.” *JQS* 22, no. 1 (2020): 78–91.
- Hashkes, Hannah E. *Rabbinic Discourse as a System of Knowledge: “The Study of Torah is Equal to Them All”*. Leiden: Brill, 2015.
- Hodgson, Marshall G. S. *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization*, 3 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974.
- Jackson, Sherman A. “Fiction and Formalism: Toward a Functional Analysis of *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*.” In *Studies in Islamic Legal Theory*, edited by Bernard G. Weiss. Leiden: Brill, 2002, 177–201.
- Lindberg, David C. “Alhazen’s Theory of Vision and Its Reception in the West.” *Isis* 58, no. 3 (1967): 321–41.
- Madelung, Wilferd. “The Spread of Māturīdism and the Turks.” In *Actas IV Congresso de Estudos Árabes e Islâmicos Coimbra-Lisboa 1968*. Leiden: Brill, 1971: 109–68.
- Makdisi, George. “Muslim Institutions of Learning in Eleventh-Century Baghdad.” *BSOAS* 24, no. 1 (1961): 1–56.
- Melchert, Christopher. *The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries C.E.* Leiden: Brill, 1997.
- Reinhart, A. Kevin. *Before Revelation: The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995.
- Saeedullah. “Life and Works of Abū Bakr al-Rāzī al-Jaṣṣāṣ.” *Islamic Studies* 16, no. 2 (1977): 131–41.
- Shehaby, Nabil. “*‘Ilā* and *Qiyās* in Early Islamic Legal Theory.” *JAOS* 102, no. 1 (1982): 27–46.
- Tillschneider, Hans-Thomas. *Die Entstehung der juristischen Hermeneutik (uṣūl al-fiqh) im frühen Islam*. Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2006.
- Vishanoff, David R. *The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists Imagined a Revealed Law*. New Haven, CT: American Oriental Society, 2011.
- Wansbrough, John. *Quranic Studies: Sources and Methods of Scriptural Interpretation*. New York: Prometheus Books, 2004.
- Watt, William Montgomery. *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought*. London: Oneworld, 2008.
- Yarbrough, Luke B. *Friends of the Emir: Non-Muslim State Officials in Premodern Islamic Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.